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Abstract 
This chapter outlines the individual country open skies agreements between the 
USA and other countries as well as the EU-US Open Skies Agreement  signed in 
2007, which came into force in 2008. Evidence is provided on the impact of both 
the individual agreements as well as the EU-US Agreement by using time series 
analysis with intervention terms to estimate the impact on passenger numbers. 
The empirical focus is on British Airways (BA) and its Open Skies off shoot airline 
serving New York from Paris Orly. Comments are also made on the recently 
discontinued service from Amsterdam (AMS) as well as the impact on slots at 
airports, including London Heathrow, and on airline start ups given the change in 
ownership regulations, for example the case of Virgin America. The data 
requirements of a more widespread assessment looking at costs and pricing is 
reviewed, following the reports of the Brattle Group and Booz Allen Hamilton, as 
well as the difficulties of dealing with the counterfactual, if such data became 
available. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
At the most recent meetings of the Air Transport Research Society, held in Abu 
Dhabi in June 2009, a paper by Eichinger, Drotleff and Fongern (2009) explored 
the schedule changes seen to result from the EU-US Open Skies Agreement1 
and described it as muted. Another paper at the same meeting raised the issue 
of the counterfactual. As Pitfield (2009a) noted, the observed scheduled changes 
may not be all attributable to the Agreement. These issues in causality suggest a 
methodology needs to be adopted that can deal with this difficulty.  
 
Earlier work on alliances by Iatrou  and Alamdari (2005) suggested that airlines 
benefited from the formation of alliances2 and, in particular, the advent of code 
sharing and the gain of immunity from US Antitrust legislation when countries 
signed individual open skies agreements with the USA. Iatrou and Alamdari 
surveyed and reported on the expectations and perceived impacts of alliances. 
There is an expectation of a positive impact on traffic on a route as well as on the 
shares of the alliance members and these impacts will be greater if the 
participating airlines operate hub and spoke systems based at both the origin and 
the destination. In addition, these impacts are thought to reach fruition “between 
1 and 2 years of the inception of the partnerships” (Iatrou and Alamdari, 2005, 
p.129) and will be greater from the inception of antitrust immunity. These findings 
were based on surveys of manager‟s opinions. These open skies agreements 
are shown in Table 1 for Europe ( Pitfield, 2009b). 
                                            
1
 On the 30
th
 April 2007 EU and US leaders signed the Open Skies Agreement at a summit in 
Washington. This came into force on March 30
th
 2008 and superseded the individual EU country Open 
Sky Agreements that many EU countries had with the US, commencing with the Netherlands in 1992. 
2
 A recent conference has discussed the importance of alliances, see Air Transport News(2009) 
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Table 1 near here 
 
 
In Pitfield (2007b)  a methodology was used to see if these opinions were 
empirically founded in evidence of changes in market share or total passengers 
on the routes. No such evidence was found but the methodology used may well 
be appropriate to deal with the issue of the counterfactual in passenger numbers 
in the assessment of the EU-US Agreement. If the first application of the model 
can produce good fit for the period before any interventions, then the significance 
of those interventions when added to the model will demonstrate their 
contribution. It was suggested that this methodology could address the 
significance of the change in passenger numbers attributable to the EU-US Open 
Skies Agreement.  The conclusion of the assessment of alliances was that, 
“It is hard to see how these results can be viewed as compatible 
with the views of the Brattle Group (2002) that the spread of open 
skies agreements will increase transatlantic traffic. Open skies 
agreements do not seem to result in either a significant growth in 
traffic or in increased competition. Indeed, the strength of the 
alliances could act as a barrier to entry, contrary to the rhetoric that 
surrounds open skies policies.” p.201 
 
 
2. The Need to Assess Open Skies Agreements. 
 
Several industry oriented meetings have been set up to discuss the EU-US Open 
Skies Agreement and the impending advent of the policy led to some 
considerable research effort by consultancies for the EU by Brattle (2002) and 
Booz Allen Hamilton (2007). These works, along with the more emotive views of 
the industry, including those of airlines and regulators, are summarised in Pitfield 
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(2009a, 2009b) and a special issue of the Journal of Air Transport Management 
contains some of the key papers from the AirNeth conferences held in 
anticipation of the Agreement in Belgium in 2008, for example, Button (2009) and 
Humphreys and Morrell (2009). 
 
Brattle and Booz Allen Hamilton were both anticipating an open aviation area but 
the actual Agreement was implemented, subject to a  suspension clause, short of 
the items that motivated  that clause, that is, the absence of full ownership and 
full cabotage rights. 
 
Indeed, the main provisions summarised in Pitfield (2009a,2009b) are: 
 
 Removal of restrictions on route rights – any EU airline is allowed to fly from any EU city 
to any US city. Conversely, any US airline can fly into any EU airport and from there onto 
third destinations. In addition, EU airlines can fly between the US and non-EU countries 
that are members of ECAA, the European Common Aviation Area, such as Norway and 
Croatia. The unequal treatment of cabotage is an issue; although US airlines can fly 
onwards in Europe, EU airlines cannot fly domestically in the US.  
 
 Foreign Ownership – the main change here is that US companies can now only own 49 
percent of the voting rights in European Airlines, whereas European Airlines can still hold 
only 25 percent in US airlines, although they can own more in non-voting shares. It is the 
intransigence of the US position here, as well as on cabotage, that has led first to a delay 
in the implementation of the Agreement  and then the EU‟s right to suspend the 
Agreement if insufficient progress towards a revised Agreement is made by mid-2010. 
 
Whereas the earlier work on alliances was concerned just with passenger 
numbers attributable to a change in the regulatory environment, the assessments 
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suggested by these two reports covers not only the resultant passenger 
numbers, that can be assessed in a similar way as before, but also the changes 
in airline costs, competition and cooperation.  The passenger numbers can be 
due to a stimulation of demand due to the fall in output restrictions or to a fall in 
prices due to a fall in costs due to a stimulus to efficiency. Prices may also fall 
due to increased cooperation, although this lessening of market power maybe  
less easy to see. To the extent that all these things happen, subject to estimates 
of price elasticity, there is a rise in consumer surplus. Clearly these issues are of 
some policy significance. 
 
It is obvious that attributing any change in passenger numbers to these causes is 
difficult. In the first instance, just identifying passenger growth due to the 
Agreement is important. In addition, to deal with the other issues requires better 
information on airline costs, on fare variations and their causes as well as to 
account for the counterfactual. It may well be the case that our ambitions must be 
limited to the assessment of passenger numbers and this is the subject of the 
empirical part of this chapter. 
 
3. The Approach to Assessment. 
 
The difficulties with costs and fares data is dealt with in Pitfield (2009a, 2009b). 
In short, cost data is lacking, except at a periodicity that does not tie in with 
passenger data and then only for larger airlines. No data is regularly gathered on 
changes in fares offered on transatlantic flights and to derive elasticities would 
require linking this to demand. Passenger data for the affected north Atlantic 
sector is kept by the US Bureau of Transportation statistics and is freely available 
 6 
online from 1990. 
 
It seems that assessment of the impact is largely hampered by the absence of 
relevant data. The exception is passengers. However, to attribute the change in 
passengers to the Agreement means that the counterfactual needs to be 
addressed. What would the traffic have been if the EU-US Agreement had not 
been signed? If that can be determined, then the difference between this and the 
actual traffic is that due to the Agreement. A time series model, given the monthly 
periodicity of the data, is appropriate and the long time history from 1990 is 
helpful. 
 
The approach is to model the passenger data up to the start of the Agreement 
and then to allow for an intervention variable to capture the additional effect of 
the Agreement. This variable can be specified as a short, sharp shock, as it was 
when the impact of Ryanair start-ups was investigated (Pitfield, 2007a), or as a 
gradual term when impacts of alliance formation were investigated (Pitfield, 
2007b). To avoid confounding influences, despite the fact that the time period 
covered is nearly 20 years and will contain a variety of economic peaks and 
troughs, specific allowance will be made for the events of September 2001 as 
well as the current global downturn. Past experience suggests that the former will 
again be found to be immediately influential whereas the latter may not for the 
reasons addressed in this paragraph although its impact at the time of writing is 
short in the time series data and it may be longer in its actual impact than 
previous recessions since 1990 that are embodied in the variations in the data 
since 1990.  
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4. An Overview of ARIMA Modelling and Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Wei (1994) contains an introduction to ARIMA modelling, intervention analysis 
and the assessment of the fit of the model to the data. Another very useful guide  
is McDowell et al (1980). In a variety of publications, including  Pitfield (2007a, 
2007b, 2008), the author has used these techniques in air transport applications 
so the following description is bound to owe something to these previous papers. 
 
Acceptable goodness-of-fit statistics will be generated by a model and the 
residuals will be white noise if the model replicates the main movements in the 
data. In this case, all the indigenous factors that cause the original data to vary 
will be covered by the model. 
 
ARIMA models are described by three parameters, (p,d,q). p is the order of a 
vector of autoregressive parameters AR(p), d is the degree of differencing and q 
refers to the order of a vector of moving average parameters, MA(q). So a 
ARIMA(1,0,0) or AR(1) model can be written as 
 
 Yt = φ1 Yt-1 + at (1) 
 
and using the backshift operator, B Yt = Yt-1 
 
     (1- φ1B) Yt = at    (2)  
where Yt  is the time series data and at is the disturbance or random shock at time 
t. There is a tendency to favour parsimonious models as well as to avoid some 
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mixed models which may suffer from parameter redundancy (McDowell et al, 
1980)3. 
 
It may be necessary to difference the data Yt to ensure stationarity If so a (1,1,0) 
model results and Yt is replaced by zt= Yt - Yt-1 and the backshift operator now is 
in terms of zt  as B zt = zt-1 
 
If the model has a seasonal component, for example, if the data is gathered over 
a long period of time and is recorded for short intervals within this period as it is 
for the data used here, then it will be necessary to specify a seasonal ARIMA 
model. These are also described by three parameters (P,D,Q)S where P is the 
order of a seasonal autoregressive vector, D is the degree of seasonal 
differencing and Q refers to the order of  a vector of moving average parameters. 
S is equal to 12 as the data is monthly with an annual periodicity.  So a SAR(1) 
or Seasonal ARIMA(1,0,0)12 model can be written as 
 
 Yt =Φ12 Yt-12+ at (3) 
 
and using the backshift operator, B12 , which as it is raised to a power involves 
repeating it, 
 
     (1- Φ12B
12) Yt = at    (4) 
If seasonal differencing is required, then this model is applied to the seasonal 
differences, wt= Yt - Yt-12.  
 
                                            
3
 In Table 3, AR(1) refers to an autoregressive model component with one parameter and SMA(1) refers 
to a seasonal moving average one parameter component.  
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Combining the two model components multiplicatively, gives an 
ARIMA(p,d,q)(P,D,Q)S model which can be generally represented as 
 
φ P(B
S) Φp(B)(1-B)
d(1-BS)Dzt = θq(B) ΘQ (B
S)at                         (5) 
 
Variations can be derived from (5), for example an ARIMA (1,1,0)(1,1,0)12 is 
applied to the regularly and seasonally differenced data where  
 
wt= zt - zt-12 = ( Yt - Yt-1)-( Yt-12 - Yt-13)  
and is given by 
wt = φ1 wt-1  + Φ12 wt-12 - φ1 Φ12 wt-13 + at                                          (6) 
 
and using the backshift operators, B and B12 now applied to wt 
 
(1- φ1B)(1- Φ12B
12) wt = at                    (7) 
 
Inspection of the Autocorrelation Coefficient Function (ACF) and Partial 
Autocorrelation Coefficient Function (PACF) determine p,d,q and P,D,Q as 
indicated above, although it is the consensus that this process is as much art as 
science.  
 
For the monthly traffic data a model is calibrated, including seasonal 
components, as this is appropriate for this data.   
 
The procedures followed for calibrating the passenger data model is described 
below. For the monthly data, from 1990, to ensure that the series has a constant 
variance a logarithmic transformation may be necessary. ACF and PACF plots  
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are examined at 12 month lags to establish whether seasonal differencing is 
required. The ACF and PACF plots are then used to determine whether an AR or 
MA model is appropriate along with the number of parameters, with a preference 
to avoid some mixed models and those with a large number of parameters. ACF 
and PACF plots are then calculated again for the residuals of this model to see 
what the non-seasonal form is and whether non-seasonal differencing is 
required. The residuals from this combined model must have white noise 
residuals. This will be shown by the Box-Ljung Q statistics and the ACF of the 
residuals.  
 
The model is determined for the data before the commencement of the 
Agreement, then the same model form, plus intervention variables, is applied to 
the whole data series to establish the impact on the total series of the start of the 
Agreement or the start of BA‟s Open Skies service. This can then be compared 
to the actual size of the passenger numbers and inferences drawn on the impact 
of the start of service. A picture of a BA Open Skies Boeing 757 in this livery is 
shown landing at New York John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK) in December 2008 in 
Figure 1. 
 
   Figure 1 near here 
 
An abrupt step function is used initially for the intervention term even though it 
might take a variety of forms, for example, individual pulses or gradual 
interventions. Other forms are subsequently investigated if intervention effects 
are hard to estimate. These resulting coefficients are then properly interpreted as 
representing the impact on the whole time series. It is also necessary to cater for 
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the impact of any other exogenous impacts on the data and this is done for the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 where it is obvious that the effects are marked as well as 
the recent global economic downturn, although the start date for this could be the 
subject of a debate.  
 
Visual inspection is sufficient to ensure that the model replicates the cycles in the 
data, given that the residuals are white noise but the assessment of the general 
applicability of the fit requires a formal assessment and this can be undertaken 
using the root mean square error. This is 
 
RMSE = 2
1
)(/1 at
T
t
s
t YYT    .                          (8)    
where stY  = forecast value of Yt 
a
tY =  the actual values and T =  time periods 
 
Comparison between model fits is difficult as this statistic is influenced by the 
absolute scale of the errors. Theil‟s inequality coefficient, U,  is used to 
counteract this difficulty as the denominator of the coefficient corrects for 
differences in scale.  
 U =   
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a
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t
T
t
a
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T
t
s
t YTYTYYT 1
22
1
2
1
)(/1)(/1)(/1         (9) 
In addition, it can be broken down into the bias, the variance and the covariance 
proportions of U where UM is an indication of systematic error, US indicates the 
ability of the model to replicate the degree of variability in the data and UC shows 
the unsystematic error. 
 
UM = 22 )()/1()( at
s
t
as YYTYY                                     (10) 
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US = 22 )()/1()( at
s
tas YYT           (11) 
 
UC = 2)()/1()1(2 at
s
tas YYT          (12) 
 
UM, US  and UM sum to 1 and ideally, UM, US = 0 and UC = 1. (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1998).  
 
In addition, Stationary R-Squared and Normalised Bayesian Information Criterion 
(Normalised BIC) are shown. The former has a range of negative infinity to 1 with 
positive values showing that the stationary part of the model is superior to a 
simple mean baseline model4. The Normalised BIC is a measure of overall fit that 
also accounts for model complexity so it is useful for examining different models 
of a single series5.  
 
5. Empirical Studies 
5.1 Supply Side Changes 
 
The abrupt changes at London Heathrow (LHR) between 2007 and 2008 were 
first shown by Cole (2008) and reproduced in Pitfield (2009a,2009b). The interest 
of the US carriers in gaining access to such an important, if slot constrained hub, 
are well known and the changes reflect that. These are illustrated in Table 2 
taken from Cole (2008). The jockeying for valued LHR slots by alliance partners 
is interesting and these often represent moves from London Gatwick (LGW) to 
                                            
4
 See Harvey (1989). 
5
 This information is from SPSS online help at mk:@MSITStore:C:\Program%20Files\SPSSInc\SPSS16 
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LHR.  In Figures 2 and 3 illustrations are made of the planned slot allocations in 
2009.  
 
 
Figures 2 and 3 near here 
 
As a result of examining these changes and the frequencies offered the most 
important candidate routes for assessment by volume are London (Heathrow, 
Gatwick, Stansted and Luton, respectively LHR, LGW, STN, LTN) – New York 
(Kennedy and Newark, JFK, EWR), London – Chicago (O‟Hare and Midway, 
ORD, MDW), London – Los Angles (LAX) and London – Washington Dulles 
(IAD)6. In each case the total traffic at origin city and destination city must be 
addressed to cover cases where flights are switched, say between LHR and 
LGW or between JFK or EWR. 
 
Further, a similar approach could be taken to investigate the impact of Virgin 
America (VX) that set up in August 2007 as a result of the ownership changes in 
the Agreement and operates between western and eastern seaboard cities in the 
USA. At present the airports served are LAX, San Diego (SAN), San Francisco 
(SFO), Las Vegas (LAS), JFK, IAD and Seattle (SEA). 
 
In addition the BA initiative of setting up a new subsidiary airline, first in Paris and 
then in AMS can also be assessed. It is this venture that is the empirical focus of 
the paper, and Paris is concentrated on as the AMS service finished in August 
2009 and the length of service post the Agreement may not be long enough for 
                                            
6
 Washington Reagan has no transatlantic traffic but a case could be made for including Baltimore. 
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the assessment technique to work. This may also be true of Paris where there is 
only 12 months of data post the Agreement and less of actual traffic experience. 
5.2 The Passenger Data. 
 
To analyse the impact of the BA Open Skies airline initiative it is necessary to 
avail the analysis of data on passengers carried between France and the USA. 
This is available online and can be downloaded, from 1990 (US Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics, 1990.) Statistics indicating the traffic carried between 
New York (both JFK and EWR) and Paris (Charles de Gaulle, CDG and Orly, 
ORY) are filtered and pasted into a new spreadsheet for each year. Flights that 
have no passengers, for example those by Federal Express, are deleted before 
the file is sorted in ascending monthly order. It is then relatively trivial to deduce 
the monthly totals for each year between Paris and New York before, in turn 
entering this monthly data into an SPSS data file for subsequent analysis. 
 
June 2008 saw the first of these flights by the BA subsidiary between JFK and 
ORY and by the year end this traffic totalled 14,406 or less than one percent of 
total passengers between the cities. However, this total for 6 months is being 
compared to an annual total so it is perhaps a better indication to examine what 
has happened so far in 2009. In the first three months traffic has amounted to 
4,927 and this is 1.49 percent of the three month total passenger traffic between 
Paris and New York. Over the whole period of operation, load factor has 
averaged 51.59 percent and this, plus the demise of the similar service offered 
from AMS to JFK, plus the failure to fulfil plans to introduce service from further 
EU major cities, like Milan, suggests that it is hard to expect that the impact of 
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BA‟s Open Skies has been significant, but a time series analysis with intervention 
analysis will determine this. 
 
Figure 4 shows the monthly passenger traffic from 1990 to the first quarter of 
2009 between Paris and New York. It can be seen that traffic has a cyclical 
pattern over each year peaking in the summer months and declining in winter. 
Initially this variation was large and it has declined over the period. Peaks have 
tended to rise from about early 2002 and troughs have been less steep over 
much of the period. 
 
 Figure 4 near here 
 
5.3 The Results of the Assessment. 
 
The procedures outlined in section 4 were followed. Preliminary analysis reveals 
that there are outliers in the series, most notably in late 2001, so the need to 
explicitly model 9/11 is empirically justified. The interpretation of the ACF and 
PACF plots suggests alternative models as appropriate to the data up to 
September 2001 and indeed, it is not clear that a logarithmic transformation is 
required to ensure a constant variance, so there are a variety of models that are 
alternatively specified in terms of  passengers or the logarithm of passengers. 
These include (2,0,1) (1,0,0)12, and (1,0,0) (0,1,1)12 on the original data and on 
the logarithmic transformations. The goodness-of-fit statistics and the relative 
parsimony along with the ACF of the residuals suggests the latter form is the 
preferred model applied to the original data with no constant term. 
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Applying the intervention variables yields no significant impacts for the Open 
Skies Agreement, BA‟s start-up of Open Skies in Paris or of the current economic 
downturn7. This is true whether these interventions are specified as steps, 
exponential increases, or pulses8.  
 
The impact of the terrorist attacks in 2001 is significant and alternative 
specifications indicate marginally different impacts. The coefficient of -46,859.97 
(t = -7.366) indicates an abrupt drop in passengers when a continuous step 
change is specified. Compared to September the year before, this is a 31 percent 
fall.  If this intervention is allowed to have lagged impacts specified, then at lag 0 
there is a decline of 47,135.21 (t = -7.393) and at lag 2, in November 2001, there 
is a further impact of -29,933.95 (t = -4.726). Although the goodness-of-fit of this 
model is slightly inferior, Table 3 shows the results for both of these models 
(Model 1 and Model 2). It also shows the best results from specifying  the 2001 
intervention as a simple pulse that gives the best overall goodness-of-fit statistics 
(Model 3). The intervention is then -48,799.48 with  a slightly reduced t = -7.267. 
  Table 3 near here 
  Figures 5 and 6 near here 
Figure 5 shows the ACF plot of the residuals from Model 3. It can be seen that 
these are white noise as they are within the confidence levels for all lags shown. 
Figure 6 demonstrates that this model also replicates the turning movements of 
the original series whilst its goodness-of-fit is demonstrated by the statistics given 
in Table 3.  
 
                                            
7
 The start date here was taken as August 2008, just prior to the demise of Lehman Brothers. However, 
the various economic cycles contained in the data since 1990 suggest this intervention is unnecessary 
irrespective of its start date or form. 
8
 As there is no non-seasonal differencing, steps and pulses can be examined. The constant is excluded 
as there is seasonal differencing. 
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The model fit could be improved if another intervention variable were allowed to 
account for the identified level shift outlier identified in November 2003. 
Investigating this month in some detail shows New York – Paris traffic at 62,668 
of which Air France carried 28,476 and the US carriers, Delta, Continental and 
American carried 23,477. The difference is the passengers carried by Air India.  
Paris – New York, totals 56,391 of which Air France has 26,591, the US airlines, 
22,197 with the balance due to Air India. It may be that the shift is due to Air 
India‟s operation. However, this started in December 2002 and so it may be, but 
this seems unlikely, that comparing the two Novembers gives rise to the outlier 
and, if this is the case, an intervention term should be specified for December 
2002, not November 2003. Traffic between the two Novembers differed by 
18,230. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The intervention analysis here failed to find a significant effect of the start of 
service of BA‟s Open Skies airline from Orly, but given the scale of the Paris – New 
York traffic and its relative size, as well as how long the service has been in 
operation, this is not surprising. However, there is no doubt that the Agreement 
facilitated this service and this in turn facilitated traffic. On this basis it cannot be 
argued that there was no impact.  However, the fact that BA discontinued the AMS 
service and has not initiated service at Milan, Frankfurt or Brussels, as it originally 
planned, plus rumours about its desire to sell the subsidiary all suggest that the 
degree of success is relatively disappointing even though its share of high yielding 
business traffic from Paris may not be. 
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In addition to BA‟s subsidiary operating at ORY, it is also clear that considerable 
changes in supply took place at LHR in 2008 and these changes were largely 
maintained in 2009. These changes are also directly attributable to the EU-US 
Open Skies Agreement and empirical estimation of the impact on passenger 
numbers from London to key destinations still has to be undertaken. 
 
Considerable changes in data availability will also be necessary if any change in 
passenger numbers can subsequently be linked to changes in fares and airline 
costs resulting from increased cooperation or competitiveness. 
 
Previous work also failed to find significant changes in passengers and alliance 
market share as a result of code sharing and the entry into individual country open 
skies agreements with the US so the nature of the findings here are consistent with 
this. 
 
Although they were never the main focus of this investigation, the impacts of 
September 2001 can be seen to vary depending on the model and variable 
specification. However, the  impacts are relatively close to each other whichever 
model is chosen and, as a result, they can be taken to represent a robust 
indication of the impact, which is considerable. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: The European Open Skies Bilaterals1 
 
Country Date 
  
Netherlands 14/10/92 
Belgium
2 
1/3/95 
Finland 24/3/95 
Denmark 26/4/95 
Norway 26/4/95 
Sweden 26/4/95 
Luxembourg 6/6/95 
Austria 14/6/95 
Czech Republic 8/12/95 
Germany
3 
29/2/96 
Italy
4 
11/11/98 
Portugal 22/12/99 
Malta 12/10/00 
Poland 31/5/01 
France 19/10/01 
 
1 The full list for the US is at US Department of State (2009) 
2,3 Provisional 
4 Comity and Reciprocity 
 
Source: Button (2008) repeated in Button (2009) 
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Table 2: Sources of Open Skies slots 
 
Airline Slots 
 
 
Air France Reduced Paris from 12 to 7  
per day:  
3 to DL, 1 CO, 1 AF to Los  
Angeles (LAX) 
KLM Dropped 2 to Eindhoven  
(EIN) and reduced Rotterdam  
(RTM) by 1:  
Funded Northwest‟s (NW)  
Detroit (DET), Minneapolis 
(MSP), Seattle (SEA) Service  
as Skyteam partner  
Alitalia Dropped 3 at Milan Malpensa  
(MXP) as part of strategic  
retrenchment: 1 to CO, 1 to  
US Airways (US) and 1 BA  
GB Airways Sold LHR slots: 2 to CO, 1 to  
BA, 1 to Qatar Airways (QR) 
Iberia Dropped 1 to Bilbao (BIO): 
Funded 2
nd
  AA Dallas (DFW) 
move to LHR from LGW 
 
Source: Cole (2008) 
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Table 3 Alternative Models of Paris – New York Passengers, 1990 – March 2009 
Model 1 (1,0,0) (0,1,1)12 
 
Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
AR(1) 0.753 16.795  
SMA(1) 0.429 6.583 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.764          
Intervention 9/11 -46859.974 -7.366 Normalised BIC = 18.145 
   RMSE = 8091.859 
   U = 0.031  Um = 0.004 
   Us =0.002  Uc = 0.972 
Model 2 (1,0,0) (0,1,1)12    
AR(1) 0.758 16.615  
SMA(1) 0.417 6.350 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.748          
Intervention 9/11, Lag 0 -47135.211 -7.393 Normalised BIC = 18.197 
Intervention 9/11, Lag 2 -29933.950 -4.726  
   RMSE = 8302.462 
   U = 0.032  Um = 0.000 
   Us =0.005  Uc = 0.987 
Model 3 (1,0,0)(0,1,1)12    
AR(1) 0.750 16.712  
SMA(1) 0.446 6.973 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.771         
Intervention 9/11 -48799.481 -7.267 Normalised BIC = 18.142 
   RMSE = 7982.063 
   U = 0.031  Um = 0.001 
   Us =0.001  Uc = 0.971 
 
 
 
